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Abstract 11 
Water distribution systems (WDSs) are critical infrastructures that need to be resilient 12 
to cope with and quickly recover from exceptional conditions in an uncertain and 13 
challenging future. To build resilience in the design of WDSs, it is essential to explore 14 
indicators that can effectively quantify the level of system resilience. On the basis of the 15 
optimization of rehabilitation designs of three benchmark WDSs, four resilience related 16 
indicators are investigated, i.e. Todini’s index, which is a surrogate and indirect 17 
performance indicator, and three direct performance indicators - failure duration, failure 18 
magnitude and a severity-based resilience index. These indicators are widely used in 19 
literature yet have not been comprehensively examined and compared. Results show 20 




that optimization using any one indicator is likely to improve system resilience measured 22 
by other indicators. Nevertheless, they have distinctive advantages and disadvantages. 23 
In particular, the severity-based resilience index is effective in identifying nodes 24 
susceptible to the occurrence of failures and slow in recovery. Todini’s index can be 25 
assessed without the need of setting up failure scenarios, which is an advantage 26 
compared to the other three resilience indicators; however, its correlations with direct 27 
resilience indicators are weaker in WDSs with tanks.  28 
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Introduction 32 
Water distribution systems (WDSs) are critical infrastructures of our society for the safe 33 
and secure provision of drinking water (USEPA 2005). These are complex systems 34 
consisting of a large number of diverse and interconnected components such as pumps, 35 
pipes, valves and storage facilities and they span over long distances (National 36 
Research Council 2006). As such, WDSs are susceptible to a wide range of acute or 37 
chronic threats and failures are reported to be reoccurring (Gheisi et al. 2016). The 38 




of rapid urbanization and climate change (Zimmerman et al. 2008; Basupi 2013).   40 
To address the challenges posed to WDSs, there is a paradigm shift in water 41 
management where system capacity to rapidly recover from failures is increasingly 42 
being valued (USEPA 2014; Minsker et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2017; Walski 2019). In 43 
the conventional design of WDSs, reliability is the primary goal so that a system can 44 
maintain the desired level of service, i.e. meeting consumers’ water demand with 45 
sufficient pressure and water quality, even under threats (Ostfeld et al. 2002; Shinstine 46 
et al. 2002; Chung et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). However, incidents that lead to 47 
unsatisfied water demand are often unavoidable and unpredictable, hence it is essential 48 
to design resilient WDSs which can minimize the negative effects of system failures and 49 
recover quickly (Zhuang et al. 2013; Diao et al. 2016). This can be achieved by 50 
conventional measures without entailing excessive costs. For example, Diao et al. 51 
(2016) found that the addition of a pump at the water source in the studied WDS can 52 
shorten the maximum failure duration by 12 hours in the firefighting scenarios and the 53 
duplication of 9 pipes can reduce water supply deficit by about 40% in the pipe break 54 
scenarios. Software platforms such as WaterGEMS and InfoWater can support 55 
decision-making by simulation of how the level of service is affected under component 56 
failures to prioritize intervention strategies such as pipe renewal and to assess fire-57 




A prerequisite for building resilience in system design is to identify representative 59 
indicators for measuring resilience. It can be based on direct measurement of resilience 60 
performance (e.g. failure duration, magnitude and severity) under scenarios where a 61 
WDS is stressed leading to failures (Fu et al. 2013; Aydin et al. 2014; Hwang et al. 2015; 62 
Diao et al. 2016; Roach et al. 2018). As such, direct resilience assessment is dependent 63 
on the set up of failure scenarios, the number of which is usually limited. To address 64 
this, indirect approaches of evaluating resilience without performing failure analysis 65 
have been proposed. For example, the hydraulic or water quality-related capability of 66 
WDSs, measured by water pressure or the level of residual disinfectant, etc., is strongly 67 
influenced by innate system properties (Meng et al. 2018) and affects how a system 68 
behaves under adverse conditions (Raad et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2017a). Todini’s index, 69 
which describes the global surplus hydraulic power above the minimum required nodal 70 
water head (Todini 2000), is such a surrogate performance indicator widely used in 71 
assessing system reliability (Farmani et al. 2005b; Saldarriaga and Serna 2007; Reca 72 
et al. 2008; Raad et al. 2010) and perceived as a resilience indicator in some studies 73 
though its relationship with resilience is not clear (Banos et al. 2011). As such, the 74 
representativeness of Todini’s index for resilience of WDSs needs to be examined by 75 
comprehensive studies. 76 




direct and one indirect resilience indicators (i.e. failure duration, magnitude and a 78 
severity-based resilience index, and Todini’s index) widely used for guiding resilient 79 
design of WDSs. This is achieved by formulation of a resilience enhance problem, 80 
whereby different types (e.g. adding pipes, pumps and/or storage tanks and 81 
duplication/cleaning/lining of pipes) and amounts (e.g. adding one to several pumps) of 82 
rehabilitation measures are applied to a WDS to obtain larger resilience. Each 83 
rehabilitation strategy, if not meeting the full level of service under normal operating 84 
conditions, can also be viewed as a failure scenario of a well-established network. 85 
Hence, the addition of a pump/pipe/tank to a WDS can be deemed as the failure of the 86 
pump/pipe/tank in the well-established WDS. Resilience indicators and cost are defined 87 
as objectives for the optimization and a wide range of Pareto optimal solutions, i.e. high 88 
performing, resilient rehabilitation strategies at various levels of cost, are obtained for 89 
analyzing the relationships of the four resilience indicators. Three case studies are 90 
examined in this work so that findings are not limited to a single WDS. The sensitivity 91 
of the research results to water demand assumptions (a key source of uncertainty) is 92 
also examined. Note that isolation valves, which are key to the performance of WDSs 93 
under pipe failures, are not represented and accounted in this work. Also, network 94 
resilience could be affected by many internal and external factors and operational 95 




contamination, natural hazards (e.g., drought, flooding and earthquake) and social-97 
economic factors (e.g., human errors and strikes) (Khatavkar and Mays 2019; Walski 98 
2020; Zhang et al. 2020). 99 
Direct resilience indicators 100 
Resilience refers to the degree to which a system minimizes the magnitude and duration 101 
of failure in service provision over its design life when subject to exceptional conditions 102 
(Hashimoto et al. (1982). It can be assessed by failure duration, failure magnitude, and 103 
severity which is a combination of the former two (Casal-Campos et al. 2015; Mugume 104 
et al. 2015a; Mugume et al. 2015b; Ward and Butler 2016; Meng et al. 2018; 105 
Sweetapple et al. 2018; Ayala-Cabrera et al. 2019). Failure duration indicates how 106 
quickly a system recovers from a failure. It is commonly measured by the average time 107 
at all nodes in a WDS that the quantity/quality of the supplied water is below the required 108 
level of service. Failure magnitude suggests how badly a system can fail and it can be 109 
quantified as the average drop in system service at all nodes at all time steps in a 110 
simulation. Severity describes the deficit in the quantity/quality of water supply 111 
compared to the total demand of the entire WDS; it is an aggregation of the failure 112 
impacts within the simulation and is not a simple multiplication of failure duration and 113 
magnitude. For the ease of understanding and analysis, the severity indicator is 114 




to as the ‘resilience index’. The dashed line represents the required level of service (e.g. 116 
nodal pressure, water quality) and the solid line represents the actual level of service. 117 
Severity is the area between the dashed and solid lines (i.e. A). The resilience index is 118 
one minus the ratio between severity and the total need (i.e. A+B). As such, the value 119 
of the resilience index is in the range of 0 to 1, which allows for direct comparison 120 
between different networks - the higher the index value, the greater the resilience of a 121 
WDS. The equation of the proposed resilience index is presented as 122 















where r is the resilience of system, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the nodal water demand at node i at the 123 
tth time step, 𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the water supply to node i at the tth time step, n is the number of 124 
nodes in a WDS, N is the number of total time steps, and 𝑙𝑡 is the duration of the tth 125 
time step. 126 
Methodology 127 
As mentioned earlier, the three direct resilience indicators, Todini’s index and cost are 128 
set as objectives for the many-objective optimization of rehabilitation design of WDSs. 129 
It is in theory equal to but more efficient than performing 10 optimizations for each pair 130 
of the five optimization objectives; moreover, by doing the optimization in one run, the 131 




comparisons between the resilience indicators (Nicklow et al. 2010; Fu et al. 2013; 133 
Reed et al. 2013; Maier et al. 2014; Matrosov et al. 2015). WDSs that cannot provide 134 
full level of service (i.e. failing to meet water demand in the system) are studied and 135 
structural and/or operational rehabilitation measures (e.g. adding new 136 
pipes/tanks/pumps and duplicating or cleaning/lining of pipes) are applied to mitigate 137 
the failures. Based on the Pareto optimal solutions, the correlations between the 138 
resilience indicators are examined to reveal their relationships and the appropriateness 139 
of using one single indicator for resilient system design. As water demand is one of the 140 
key sources of uncertainty affecting system performance, the sensitivity of the research 141 
findings of this work to water demand assumptions is tested. This is achieved by 142 
repeating the optimization of rehabilitation for a case study WDS under different water 143 
demand scenarios, including fireflow, increased base demands, stochastic water usage 144 
behavior and leakage.  145 
A pressure-driven hydraulic simulation model of WDSs developed by Morley and 146 
Tricarico (2008) is employed in this study. It is a modification of the demand-driven 147 
hydraulic simulation model EPANET2 (Rossman 2000; Morley and Tricarico 2008) so 148 
that the amount of water supply to a node is determined by nodal pressure (Wagner et 149 
al. 1988) rather than in full level of service regardless of water pressure. As such, the 150 




behavior under abnormal conditions, such as involving excessively high water demands 152 
(e.g. for firefighting) or under component (pipes, pumps, etc.) failures leading to low 153 
pressures in a WDS. 154 
Mathematical formulations of the four resilience indicators are provided in Equations (1) 155 
and (S1) to (S3) in the Supplemental Data. The cost of rehabilitation includes both the 156 
capital and operational costs. Capital costs are for new pipes (linking two nodes not 157 
connected before) and tanks, pipe duplication (linking two nodes already connected), 158 
and cleaning and lining of existing pipes. The costs for pipes are calculated by 159 
multiplying pipe length with unit costs for new pipes/cleaning/lining which are functions 160 
of pipe diameter. The cost for a new tank relates to the tank capacity. The operational 161 
cost refers to the energy cost for running pumps and is calculated by multiplying 162 
electricity tariff ($0.12/kWh in the case study) with the total energy consumption (in kWh, 163 
determined by pump efficiency and operational schedule). More details on the cost-164 
related parameters can be found in Center for Water Systems (2004). Non-dominated 165 
sorting algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) is employed as it is a fast and popular 166 
evolutionary algorithm for multi-objective optimization (Farmani et al. 2005a; 167 




Case studies 169 
Three benchmark WDSs (New York Tunnel, Anytown and EXNET) (Center for Water 170 
Systems 2004) are chosen as the case studies. They are widely used in system design-171 
related studies with rehabilitation options defined and provided. The three WDSs vary 172 
in size, topology and system configurations as shown in Figure 2 and Table S1. New 173 
York Tunnel (NYT) (Figure 2a) is a gravity-fed water supply network that can be 174 
rehabilitated by duplication of any pipes. For each duplicating pipe, there are 15 options 175 
of pipe diameter and a ‘do nothing’ option (i.e. no duplication). EXNET (Figure 2b) is a 176 
much larger WDS where 567 pipes (highlighted in thick lines in Figure 2b) of the total 177 
3032 pipes can be chosen for duplication with 10 diameter options or ‘do nothing’ as 178 
defined in the system file. Anytown (Figure 2c) is more complex than the former two 179 
WDSs in terms of operation as it has several pumps and tanks. The network needs to 180 
be reinforced to meet the projected water demand increase (Walski et al. 1987) and 181 
rehabilitation measures include duplicating or cleaning and lining of 35 selected pipes 182 
(in solid lines in Figure 2c), adding six new pipes between nodes not connected before 183 
(in dashed lines in Figure 2c), optimizing the operational schedules of all pumps, and 184 
building two new tanks at any nodes with no existing tanks connected (Basupi 2013; 185 
Atkinson et al. 2014). As such, the investigated rehabilitation measures are structural-186 




Additional description or assumption of the three cases is presented in the 188 
Supplemental Data. As resilience is associated with dynamic performance of a system 189 
under failure, a water demand pattern (i.e. multiplying daily water demand with hourly 190 
coefficients, as presented in Table S2) is applied to enable extended period simulations. 191 
Results show hydraulic failures (i.e. insufficient water pressure exists at certain nodes) 192 
in all three WDSs. Some other commonly used measures to increase resilience such 193 
as adaptive pump operation during pipe failure (Zhuang et al. 2013), providing back-up 194 
pumps, adding isolation valves (Walski 1993a; b; Liu et al. 2017b) to reduce the impacts 195 
of pipe break, reduction in transients, emergency connections to neighboring water 196 
systems and improved communications, are not considered and can be examined in 197 
future studies (Murphy et al. 1994; Center for Water Systems 2004; Walski 2020). 198 
The decision variables for the optimization are case-specific and include diameter for 199 
duplicated/added pipes, operational scheduling of pumps, if cleaning or lining is 200 
provided for pipes, and if and how (size and location) tanks are added. There are 21, 201 
567 and 77 decision variables of the three case studies respectively. The optimization 202 
is performed with a population size of 500, which is found to be sufficiently large to 203 
produce satisfactory results according to a preliminary test. The optimization is run for 204 
1000 generations, as the changes in the average objective values (among the optimal 205 




The cross rate and mutation rate are set as the default values of 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. 207 
Due to the diverse rehabilitation options in Anytown, this WDS is selected to perform 208 
the following scenarios with different water demand assumptions for the sensitivity 209 
analysis.  210 
• S1 - ‘Fireflow’:  A slightly modified demand pattern with two hours of excessively 211 
large water consumption (2.5 times as much as under normal condition) is applied 212 
to node 19 (one of the nodes with the highest water demands, defined as the point 213 
for fireflow analysis in the system file) to simulate fire flow conditions. The time and 214 
duration of the fire flow coincide with low water level at the tanks and one pump 215 
being out of service, which enable the appraisal of system resilience under extreme 216 
conditions. According to the definition of the network, the minimum required 217 
pressure in the firefighting scenario is set to be 20 psi (14.06 m) rather than the 218 
minimum pressure standard at normal conditions (28.13m).  219 
• S2 – ‘Increased base demands’: The nodal base demand is 1.2 times of that in the 220 
normal condition scenario (Table S3) while other settings remain the same.  221 
• S3 – ‘Stochastic water usage behavior’: Five different demand patterns are created 222 
and randomly assigned to different nodes (Tables S3 and S4). Other parameters 223 




• S4 – ‘Leakage’: Additional modifications are made to S3 by adding water leakage 225 
randomly placed at different locations in the network. The total amount of leakage 226 
is about 10-20% of the customer water demand. The simulation of leakage is 227 
described in the Supplemental Data.  228 
Results and discussion 229 
Relationships between the optimization objectives 230 
The Pareto optimal rehabilitation solutions obtained for the three WDSs are presented 231 
in Figure 3, where each line represents a solution plotted against the five objectives (i.e. 232 
the vertical lines). The arrows at the top of the vertical lines show the desirable direction 233 
of the objective value (i.e. lower cost and higher resilience). There is a clear trade-off 234 
between cost and resilience (i.e. cost increases with higher resilience). The cost of 235 
being more resilient is case specific; moreover, the marginal cost for improvement in 236 
resilience gets higher as the value of resilience increases. In New York Tunnel, the 237 
Todini’s index increases from 0.31 to 0.68 (120% increase) by rehabilitation measures 238 
that cost $58 x106 (135% increase), yet the same amount of investment only improves 239 
the index value by 0.02 if the initial value is 0.82 (i.e. 2% of increase in Todini’s index 240 
by 30% increase in cost). The trade-off between cost and resilience, the desirable level 241 




of rehabilitation strategy to implement.  243 
The linear correlation coefficients (r) between each pair of the five objectives based 244 
on all the optimal strategies are presented in Table 1. Strong correlations are observed 245 
between the four resilience indicators (except that between failure magnitude and other 246 
indicators in EXNET because the failure magnitude in this network is clustered around 247 
two values as explained in the next section). However, there are more lines crossing 248 
between Todini’s index and resilience and between failure magnitude and failure 249 
duration in Figure 3c than Figures 3a and 3b. This may be caused by the existence of 250 
storage tanks in the network, which play a key role in enhancing system resilience 251 
against failures but is not well captured by the Todini’s index. Similar relationships 252 
between the five objectives are observed in the other four scenarios of Anytown as 253 
presented in Table S5 and Figure S4.  254 
The correlations can also be seen by plotting the optimal strategies against cost 255 
and each resilience indicator. Figure 4 shows the results on Anytown, with the Pareto 256 
optimal fronts against each pair of objectives (i.e. cost and one resilience indicator) 257 
highlighted in orange, yellow, purple and green respectively. Had the two-objective 258 
problems with each resilience index and cost been solved separately, the same Pareto 259 
fronts should have been obtained assuming that the influence of optimization algorithms 260 




strong correlations between the resilience indicators can be seen from the similar 262 
shapes between dots with different colors. The weaker correlations in Anytown than 263 
NYT and EXNET are obvious as the dots are not as close together in Figure 4 as 264 
Figures S6 and S7.  265 
Performances of different resilience indicators 266 
Despite the strong correlations between the resilience indicators, each indicator 267 
provides valuable perspectives on the resilience performance of WDSs. Figure 5 shows 268 
the results of the optimal strategies plotted against Todini’s index and failure 269 
duration/magnitude. It can be seen that failure duration can vary greatly for strategies 270 
with the same value of Todini’s index. For example, the failure duration ranges from 5.7 271 
to 9.6 hours when Todini’s index is 0.39 for Anytown as shown in Figure 5c. In 272 
comparison, the variations in failure magnitude are smaller which is in agreement with 273 
the stronger correlations between failure magnitude and Todini’s index. Similar results 274 
are shown in the other four scenarios of Anytown as presented in Figure S5.  275 
The examination of values of the direct resilience indicators at single nodes help 276 
identify the vulnerable places that may fail badly or cannot recover rapidly after failures. 277 
For example, the failure magnitude of EXNET clusters at two values (i.e. 1×10-6 and 278 




to a few crucial nodes having greater impacts than others in influencing the result of 280 
failure magnitude which is an average value among all nodes. These critical nodes are 281 
clustered at three areas near the end of the network hence are subject to limited 282 
influence from most rehabilitation measures applied in the network. By contrast, Todini’s 283 
index is a summation of surplus energy at all nodes in a network, hence cannot support 284 
the localization of vulnerable nodes in a WDS. 285 
Todini’s index is strongly correlated with the direct resilience indicators, suggesting 286 
that the surplus energy of a WDS measured under one scenario is indicative of its 287 
hydraulic capacity under other scenarios. However, it performs less satisfactory on 288 
WDSs with storage tanks as mentioned in the previous section. This finding agrees with 289 
discussions on the limitation of excess capacity indicators in representing resilience 290 
(Walski 2020). Moreover, its value is not indicative of the absolute resilience capacity 291 
of a WDS and should not be used to compare performance of different WDSs. For 292 
example, the failure duration and magnitude of New York Tunnel can be as low as zero 293 
if Todini’s index is higher than 0.68. However, rehabilitation solutions that have the same 294 
value of Todini’s index of Anytown still show high failure impacts, that is, failure duration 295 





The relationships between the Todini’s index, a widely used surrogate performance 298 
indicator, and three direct indicators of resilience (failure duration, failure magnitude and 299 
a severity-based resilience index) are investigated in this study. This is achieved by the 300 
optimization of rehabilitation measures towards lower cost and higher resilience of three 301 
typical benchmark WDSs. Todini’s index is a widely used indicator for system design 302 
and can be assessed without setting up failure scenarios. Results show that Todini’s 303 
index is strongly correlated with the direct resilience indicators with the two networks 304 
without tanks, NYT and EXNET. However, the Todini’s index should be used with 305 
caution for resilience design as its correlation with the direct resilience indicators are 306 
found to be weaker for WDSs with complex configurations containing water tanks such 307 
as the Anytown network. Moreover, the Todini’s index value should not be used to 308 
compare the resilience of different WDSs. 309 
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